17/1 Malaya Ordynka Str., Moscow, 119017
This paper is aimed at the development of a tool analysing the AAI results for the Russian older citizens from different population groups, as well as at identifying factors underlying the inequalities in active ageing outcomes by calculation the AAI on the national and individual levels. The adaptation of the methodology of the AAI to the individual-level data and the limitations of the approach are explicitly explained. The older generations of Russia show relatively high levels of education, financial security and engagement in family care, especially in the care to children. The most significant potential for development have employment, volunteering, political engagement, physical activity, lifelong learning and use of the Internet. The calculation of the AAI at the individual level has revealed significant inequalities in the degree of realisation of potential in different areas of active ageing. The results of the project provide scientific evidence for the implementation of policy measures in the target groups. The high correlation of the index values with human capital indicators (health and education) underlines the importance of the early interventions aimed at promoting and supporting human capital at the earlier stages of the life course till the old age. The substantial positive connection of employment with other forms of activity stresses the necessity of developing a package of activation policy measures aimed at the retention of older adults in the labour market. At the same time, the statistical analysis showed the absence of a “dilemma of choice” between certain types of activity of the older generation, for example, between caring for grandchildren and employment, or employment and volunteering - the potential in different areas may be increased simultaneously.
Global climate change is a key challenge to the global economy in the twenty-first century. To address it properly, a combination of mitigation and adaptation strategies is required. Although the responsibility for adaptation lies primarily with national governments (though, even here, poorer countries need international support), mitigation is one of the key fields of international cooperation. There is little chance that the fundamental objective of stopping global temperatures from rising more than 2 °С can be reached without a stable and comprehensive global governance system. The current international climate change regime based on the Paris Agreement is insufficient to prevent catastrophic climate change. Deeper cooperation between leading economies is especially necessary, including among those that are now reluctant to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
This paper explores the consequences of different policy assumptions and the derivation of globally consistent, national low-carbon development pathways for the seven largest greenhouse gas (GHG)–emitting countries (EU28 as a bloc) in the world, covering approximately 70% of global CO2 emissions, in line with their contributions to limiting global average temperature increase to well below 2 °C as compared with pre-industrial levels. We introduce the methodology for developing these pathways by initially discussing the process by which global integrated assessment model (IAM) teams interacted and derived boundary conditions in the form of carbon budgets for the different countries. Carbon budgets so derived for the 2011–2050 period were then used in eleven different national energy-economy models and IAMs for producing low-carbon pathways for the seven countries in line with a well below 2 °C world up to 2050. We present a comparative assessment of the resulting pathways and of the challenges and opportunities associated with them. Our results indicate quite different mitigation pathways for the different countries, shown by the way emission reductions are split between different sectors of their economies and technological alternatives.
A society that allows glaring inequality is likely to pay a higher price for getting out of the crisis caused by the pandemic, a Valdai Club expert says. This means more deaths, greater impoverishment risks for a part of the population, and most likely a deeper crisis. So, addressing the problem of excessive income inequality is a prerogative for more than just social policy.
The trend on electricity grids digitalization is gradually leading to the shift of busi-ness value towards more sustainable and efficient electricity services. Sustainability and efficiency are challenged by the increasing demand for electricity which is fol-lowed by a dramatic transformation of energy systems. While smart grids seem to be crucial in this process, there is a discrepancy in understanding the costs and benefits for the multiple actors involved. In addition, there are benefits of smart grids that cannot be measured directly in terms of money, such as higher energy system reliabil-ity or commitment to carbon reduction. Despite the rise of interest to the managerial aspects of smart grids implementation and development, many aspects remain out of the scope. This paper contributes to the research of smart grids by providing a con-ceptualized business model that would allow for value co-creation, delivery and cap-ture. A Russian energy sector perspective is primarily considered throughout the pa-per and the results are supported by evidence from interviews with of industrial ex-perts
This chapter provides a synopsis of the economic dimensions of the Barents Sea Region. It discusses the economic value of different resources, including fisheries and aquaculture, oil and gas development, mining, and tourism, as well as the economic potential of other resources like wave energy and genetic resources in both the Norwegian and Russian components of the Barents Sea Region. The main features of the economies of the Barents Sea Region include: orientation to the development of natural resources (organic and inorganic) and biological resources (fish and sea animals) together with economic activities molded by the traditional way of life of indigenous peoples of the Arctic region and largely aimed at meeting their needs.
Historically, extreme remoteness and cold have left the Bering Strait region sparsely populated and economically undeveloped. Costs are very high and infrastructure is minimal. Economies are undeveloped, and based primarily on mining and government. Population densities are very low. A high proportion of residents are Natives for whom subsistence hunting and fishing remain important sources of food. In the future, environmental, economic, political and technological factors are likely to bring increased economic activity to the region—although the timing and scale of future economic change are difficult to predict. Economic activities most likely to grow include marine transportation; onshore and offshore mineral and hydrocarbon development; land-based and cruise ship tourism; commercial fishing; and government services and infrastructure needed to support economic and population growth. The nature, timing and scale of growth will depend on a wide range of factors including change in ice conditions, the extent of future resource discoveries; and the extent to which governments make development of the region an economic and strategic priority. Significant economic activities in the Bering Strait region for which shared governance issues are currently or likely to become important include marine subsistence, marine transportation, offshore oil and gas development, commercial fishing, and cruise ship tourism.
The modern system of global governance consists of a number of regimes in different issue-areas: security, finance, trade, investment and many other areas of global competition and cooperation. Despite a seemingly inexhaustible variety of those regimes, all of them may be classified by a finite (and small) number of governance structures. In our research, we defined seven types of governance structures, top–down: from global hierarchical coordinating bodies with powerful enforcement tools to a free international market. International actors based their choice of governance structures on a countable number of factors. Academic researchers working within the framework of transaction cost economics, primarily at the micro-level, investigated these factors.
This chapter seeks to identify the set of factors that played an important role in the choice of current modes of global governance, to trace their recent changes and to elucidate the economic rationale for the apparent or forecasted evolution of those governance structures. We focus our investigation on several global governance regimes—for energy, the environment and trade. Although these areas are transforming as the economic environment shifts, they nevertheless display patterns common to the general evolution of governance structures.
The author assesses the risks and opportunities for Russia as the world transitions to an increasingly green economy. The growing focus on developing a more sustainable greener world economy presents both risks and opportunities to Russia. The move towards green technologies undermines Russia’s economic model that has been excessively reliant on oil and gas, although opportunities also emerge due to the abundance of natural capital in Russia. Embracing the green wave could be a key driver for Russian technological development and modernization, and concurrently position Russia as a champion of global environmental security.
Because the Russian economy relies heavily on exports of fossil fuels, the primary source of human-induced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, it may be adversely impacted by Paris Agreement-based climate policies that target reductions in GHG emissions. Applying the MIT Economic Projection and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model to assess the impacts on the Russian economy of the efforts of the main importers of Russian fossil fuels to follow the global goals of the Paris Agreement, we project that climate-related actions outside of Russia will lower the country’s GDP growth rate by about one-half of a percentage point. The Paris Agreement is also expected to raise Russia’s risks of facing market barriers for its exports of energy-intensive goods, and of falling behind in the development of low-carbon energy technologies that most of the world is increasingly adopting.
The G20 and BRICS were born in a crowded world of international institutions following the 2008 financial and economic crisis. The G20 sought to manage the crisis, reform the international architecture and devise a new global consensus. BRICS committed to foster cooperation and policy coordination between its members and promote the international institutions reform. However, 10 years later, the G20’s and BRICS’ pursuit of the international monetary and trade systems reform has produced no fundamental results. This chapter looks into the history of the international monetary and trading systems reform endeavours and examines G20 and BRICS engagement with international organisations for better economic governance, focusing on the IMF, the MDBs and the WTO. It argues that the G20 and BRICS must increase efforts to create a global governance system that reflects new economic and technological realities, responds to persistent challenges, and creates conditions for a balanced and inclusive growth.
The global COVID-19 pandemic and an unexpected recession of a dangerous magnitude have provided strong reasons to look at the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) from three points of view: the SDGs as a victim of the recession 2020; the SDGs as an opportunity for better coordination on the way out of recession; and the SDGs as an object of modernization for better adaptation to the realities on “the global ground”. The BRICS countries are, naturally, the primary group of interest for developing and implementing the SDGs on the global scale as a way of catching up. “Pandemic protocol” and additional indicators are proposed as an urgent update to several SDGs.
In the last 50 years, the biosphere, upon which humanity depends, has been altered to an unparalleled degree. The current economic model relying on fossil resources and addicted to “growth at all costs” is putting at risk not only life on our planet, but also the world’s economy. The need to react to the unprecedented COVID-19 crisis is a unique opportunity to transition towards a sustainable wellbeing economy centered around people and nature. After all, deforestation, biodiversity loss and landscape fragmentation have been identified as key processes enabling direct transmission of zoonotic infectious diseases. Likewise, a changing climate has profound implications for human health. Putting forward a new economic model requires transformative policies, purposeful innovation, access to finance, risk-taking capacity as well as new and sustainable business models and markets. But above all we need to address the past failure of our economy to value nature, because our health and wellbeing fundamentally depends on it. A circular bioeconomy offers a conceptual framework for using renewable natural capital to holistically transform and manage our land, food, health and industrial systems with the goal of achieving sustainable wellbeing in harmony with nature. Within the framework of the Sustainable Markets Initiative, under the leadership of His Royal Highness The Prince of Wales, a 10-Point Action Plan to create a circular bioeconomy is proposed below. The Action Plan is a response to The Prince of Wales’ call to invest in nature as the true engine for our economy. The Action Plan, guided by new scientific insights and breakthrough technologies, is articulated around six transformative action points further discussed below and four enabling action points, which mutually reinforce each other.
This paper examines Japan’s participation in global value chains (GVCs). To this end, we use plant-level data for Japan to split output in each industry in Japan’s manufacturing sector into output for export or domestic sale and create an extended multi-country input-output table (MIOT). We then compute trade in value added (TiVA) indicators to examine the participation of Japanese manufacturing plants in GVCs. Our estimates suggest that Japan’s forward participation in GVCs is lower than suggested by estimates computed from a traditional MIOT. We infer that this result is due to high cross-border production fragmentation as well as the large presence of Japanese multinational companies in global manufacturing and the high volume of intra-firm trade in Japan’s manufacturing sector. We conclude that considering firm heterogeneity in production for export and domestic sale in MIOTs provides a more accurate understanding of global production fragmentation.
Forest ecosystems, their products and services play an important role in achieving ambitious climate change mitigation objectives at the same time requiring profound adaptation to climate change. Forest management schemes to support climate action have to be developed within their regional context but also have to be aligned with national or EU-level climate, forest and sustainability policies. The conference on “Managing forests in the 21st century” is the final conference of the FORMASAM, REFORCE and FOREXCLIM research projects. The conference bringstogether scientific experts on forest management from all over Europe facing very specific management challenges. The aim isto discuss and improve the understanding the role of forests and forest management in the context of climate change. The conference addresses climate change impacts, as well as needs for mitigation and adaptation especially with regard to the following scientific questions: 1. What are the impacts of climate extremes and disturbances? 2. What are the management challenges (and options) for resilient forests? 3. What can we do to increase the contribution of forest management to climate change mitigation?
Over the last decade academic literature faced a boom of publications devoted to the notion of ecosystem, which resulted in the emergence of various research streams and corresponding fragmentation of the research domain. Existing variety of meanings and contradictory definitions necessitates conducting a thorough literature review on three tightly coupled concepts of innovation ecosystem, business ecosystem and entrepreneurial ecosystem. This study is based upon a mixed technique, which combines bibliometric analysis and in-depth investigation of papers devoted to these research streams. Trough examining their theoretical background, constructing conceptual structures and in-depth analysis we were able to define the essence of innovation, business and entrepreneurial ecosystems as well as their distinctive features. Then we proceed with the comparative analysis of these concepts, which allowed us to outline existing similarities and to demarcate them from an ontological perspective. This study provides certain clarification for the existing conceptual mix in the field of ecosystem research and can be used as a foundation for a further investigation of the concept.
This article deals with the regulation of the natural gas sector in Russia through the lens of institutional economics. It proposes a framework in which ‘meso-institutions’ bridge the gap between the macro-institutions shaping the ‘rules of the game,’ with the Kremlin at the core, and the micro-layer within which firms operate. We argue that the slow reform process comes from conflicts of interest embedded in these meso-institutions, specifically: the Federal Antimonopoly Service, the Ministry of Energy, and the Ministry of Economic Development. Based on official documents, data from various public sources, and semi-directive interviews and discussions, our analysis shows that parties are locked in a sub-optimal equilibrium.